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Non-Discrimination and Equality in the Right of Political 
Participation for minorities 
STEVEN WHEATLEY 
University of Liverpool, UK 
 
Non-discrimination in the right of political participation is essential for the protection of 
the interests of all minority groups –  both minorities by force and minorities by will. This 
article considers some of the measures necessary to ensure effective participation by 
minorities in the deliberative and decision-making processes of the democratic state. For 
minorities by will, what the author calls ethno-cultural minorities, the right of political 
participation, within a deliberative understanding of democratic government, also implies 
the need to introduce special measures, including where necessary the introduction of 
autonomy regimes, to protect and promote the minority culture. The author then goes on 
to examine this proposition in the second half of the article, paying particular attention to 
the provisions set out in the ‘Lund Recommendations’ on Effective Participation of 




There is no general obligation for the state to introduce democracy in international 
law.1 Democracy is though an implicit requirement for signatories of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),2 and in Europe there is a clear 
commitment by all states to democratic forms of government.3 The form of democracy 
that emerges from the human rights instrument is liberal in character, in that 
democracy is defined and structured within the limits established by individual human 
rights norms. In a liberal democracy, the individual is of central concern. The state 
                                                 
1 The basis of the emerging ‘right to democratic government’ is the internal aspect of the right to self-
determination, and the human rights to freedom of political activity and to free and fair elections: 
Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 AJIL (1992) 46, 52. See, Wheatley, 
“Democracy in International Law: A European Perspective”, 51 ICLQ (2002) 225, 227-235. 
2 Those states who have ratified the ICCPR are committed to respect the right of their peoples to 
democratic government contained in Articles 1 (self-determination), 19 (freedom of expression), 22 
(freedom of association), and 25 (right to free elections). 
3 The Treaty on European Union 1992 provides in Article 6 (1), that “The Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member states”; the Council of Europe’s Court on Human 
Rights has concluded that democracy …  appears to be the only political model contemplated by the 
[European Convention on Human Rights] and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it” (United 
Communist Party of Turkey and others v Turkey, Reports 1998-I, at para. 45) and the participating 
states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have agreed to “build, consolidate 
and strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations”, and to “co-operate and 
support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible” (CSCE Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe (1990) 30 ILM 190 (1991)).  
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must justify interferences in individual liberty, and must protect the individual from 
interferences by others. The regime on minority rights, as part of a wider human rights 
regime, recognizes that membership of a minority group is a matter of personal 
choice4 –  a person may not be ascribed to a minority group against their will. 
Individuals not groups are the basic unit in the human rights regime. Democracy in the 
liberal, human rights, sense cannot be constructed by accommodating bargains 
concluded between those who claim to represent different groups in the population. 
That said, restrictions on individual liberty are permissible for the protection of the 
rights of others, in the interests of the wider society and to protect the cultural security 
of minority groups.5 Any restriction must be proportionate to the aim pursued.6 
Liberalism in this sense is not to be equated with the economic liberalism that 
supports the unfettered free market, or the social liberalism of the progressive left. Nor 
does it conceive of an atomized individual, seeking to form their own beliefs on all 
issues, isolated from the values of the community in which they were brought up, or 
now reside. Liberalism rests on the idea that individuals within a polity may be 
governed only by institutions that can be justified to reasonable persons. That 
justification must take into account the different identities of the individuals 
concerned. In a democracy, the legitimacy of government rule depends upon the will 
of all the people to their being governed by those in power. Sovereignty lies with the 
people, who rule on a basis of political equality (Held 1996: 1, Crawford 1994: 4).  
In a democracy, policies and regulations should be determined by a majority of 
concerned citizens. The justification for this in liberal democratic thought is not clear. 
According to John Locke, the majority have the right to determine policy, as it is 
necessary that the body should “move that way whither the greater force carries it”. 
Locke (1964: II 96, at 350). The only alternative would be the consent of each 
individual, but “such consent is next impossible ever to be had” (ibid.). For minorities, 
                                                 
4 See, Article 3(1), Framework Convention on National Minorities: “Every person belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no 
disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that 
choice”. 
5 See Kitok v Sweden, No. 197/1985, UN Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985, 10 August 1988, paras. 9.7 
and 9.8. 
6 Lovelace v Canada, No. 24/1977, UN Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/24/1977, 30 July 1981, para. 17: “it does 
not seem to the Committee that to deny Sandra Lovelace the right to reside on the reserve is reasonable, 
or necessary to preserve the identity of the tribe”. 
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the legitimacy of majority rule is problematic. Human rights norms limit the 
application of majority rule. The prohibition against torture exists even in the face of a 
democratically expressed will for its use. International minority rights norms, beyond 
those on non-discrimination and provisions already contained in human rights 
instruments, are insufficiently prescriptive to provide grounds for challenging state 
policies before judicial bodies. The language of the UN Declaration is opaque and 
often exhortatory (see, for example, Art. 4(3)),7 the relevant clauses of the Framework 
Convention struck through with conditional clauses and vague formulations (see, Art. 
10(2)).8 Where minorities are excluded from the decision-making process they may 
challenge the legitimacy of majority decision. This may be particularly important for 
what Thornberry refers to as ‘minorities by force’ (1991: 9-10) and Packer as 
‘negative associations’, following Wiessner, who talks about ‘non-organic (or 
involuntary) associations’.9 These groups are created by outside designation, 
invariably for negative purposes. An example would include the African-American 
population of the United States. Democratic norms do not permit such persons to be 
excluded from the democratic process.  
The principle of non-discrimination in the right of political participation is central 
to liberal democratic thought. Citizens who are members of an ethno-cultural, national 
or any other type of minority group enjoy an equal right of political participation with 
all other members of the polity. The point is made clear in the International Covenant 
and the European Convention on Human Rights. Article 25, of the ICCPR provides 
that the right of political participation is to be enjoyed without discrimination, inter 
alia, on grounds of race, language, national origin or other status.10 Article 3 of the 
                                                 
7 “States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to encourage 
knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their 
territory. Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the 
society as a whole.” 
8 “In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, 
if those persons so request and where such a request corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall 
endeavour to ensure, as far as possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority 
language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities”. 
9 Packer (1999) 254. S. Wiessner, “Faces of Vulnerability”, in G. Alfredsson and P. Macalister (eds) 
The Living Law of Nations (1996) 221. 
10 Article 25 provides three distinct rights: 1) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives; 2) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which 
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors; and 3) to have access on general terms of equality, to public 
services in his country. See, also, Article 23(1), American Convention on Human Rights (1969); Article 
13(1), African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981). 
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first Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights (P1-3)11 may be invoked 
in conjunction with the non-discrimination article.12 This point is reiterated in the UN 
Declaration on Minorities, and in Article 15 of the Framework Convention on 
National Minorities.13 Inclusion is also important for those groups Thornberry refers 
to as ‘minorities by will’ (1991: 9-10) or ‘positive/organic (or voluntary) associations’ 
(Packer 1999: 254). These consist of a group of persons, predominantly of common 
descent, who think of themselves as possessing a distinct cultural identity (which 
includes religion and language differences) and who evidence a desire to transmit this 
to succeeding generations. These ‘ethno-cultural’ minorities raise the same questions 
as minorities by force (i.e. those of inclusion) and different ones. Such groups are 
defined by their real not imagined differences to the majority population/culture. In 
one sense, they are defined by the claims that individuals from those groups make for 
special treatment in the face of a dominant majority culture. When issues are being 
considered that impact directly on the cultural identity of majority and minority 
groups, on issues such as work rest days, the use of public languages, funding of 
particular activities associated with one or another culture, then it cannot be 
acceptable for ethno-cultural minorities to find themselves constantly outvoted by the 
majority population.  
This article considers first the question of inclusion for all minority groups, before 
examining demands by ethno-cultural minorities for exemption from the application 
of adopted norms. For members of ethno-cultural minorities, the right of political 
participation means more than the right to seek to influence the outcome of a process 
designed to aggregate individual preferences to find a decision acceptable to a 
                                                 
11 P1-3 provides: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals 
by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in 
the choice of the legislature”. It contains an implicit recognition of an individual right to “equality of 
treatment of all citizens in the exercise of their right to vote and their right to stand for election” (Case 
of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt (1987) Series A No. 113, para 54).  
12 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as …  race, colour, language, religion …  national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, birth or other status”, Article 14, ECHR. 
13 Article 2(2), UN Declaration on Minorities (1992): “Persons belonging to minorities have the right 
to participate effectively in …  public life”; Article 15, Framework Convention on National Minorities: 
“Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to 
national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those 
affecting them”. See, also, the CSCE Copenhagen Document which provides that “participating States 
will respect the right of persons belonging to national minorities to effective participation in public 
affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of 
such minorities” (1990) 29 ILM 1318, para. 35.  
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majority of citizens. This is clear from the ‘Lund Recommendations’ on Effective 
Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (1999).14 Recommendation 1 
provides:  
 
participation of national minorities in public life is an essential component of a 
peaceful and democratic society. Experience in Europe and elsewhere has 
shown that, in order to promote such participation, governments often need to 
establish specific arrangements for national minorities. These Recommendations 
aim to facilitate the inclusion of minorities within the State and enable 
minorities to maintain their own identity and characteristics, thereby promoting 
the good governance and integrity of the State. 
 
This, John Packer describes as their “immediate and ultimate aim”, with the remaining 
Recommendations essentially showing what to do, including various options, and how 
to achieve the stated aim. They concern both the issue of participation in decision-
making (“having a say”) and that of self-governance for minorities (“having control”) 
(2000: 40). 
 
II. “ Having a Say”  
 
Elections provide the clearest expression of the will of the people.15 No democracy can 
discern the popular will in the absence of free and fair elections. The role of the citizen, 
however, extends beyond the right to vote in free and fair elections to determine who 
will hold power (cf. Schumpeter 1976: 284-5). All citizens have the right to participate 
in political deliberation and activity as the society seeks to determine the answers to the 
political questions of the day. No one has a monopoly on truth, and dissenting voices 
have a right to be heard in the process of devising those laws by which all in the 
community must live (Canadian Supreme Court [1998] 2 S.C.R. Reference re Secession 
of Quebec 217, para. 68). Individuals may not be excluded because they are members of 
minority groups nor because they propose particular measures. In both United 
                                                 
14 Whilst the work is that of a body of independent experts, the Recommendations are rooted in 
existing commitments, both legal and political, of OSCE states, and have been described as an 
“authoritative interpretation of the relevant international standards” on political participation and 
minorities (Packer 2000: 41). 
15 Art. 21(3) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights: “The will of the people shall be the basis 
of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections … ”: 
General Assembly Resolution 217A (III) 1948 
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Communist Party of Turkey and others and Socialist Party and others, the European 
Court of Human Rights determined that political parties in Turkey could not be 
proscribed because they advocated autonomy for the Kurdish population within a federal 
state. The Court concluded: 
 
[T]he fact that such a political programme is considered incompatible with the 
current principles and structures of the Turkish State does not make it 
incompatible with the rules of democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to 
allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that 
call into question the way a State is currently organised… . (Socialist Party and 
others v Turkey, Reports 1998-III para. 47; see also United Communist Party of 
Turkey and others v Turkey, Reports 1998-I, paras. 55-7). 
 
Likewise, in Stankov v Bulgaria, the Court determined that the fact that a group calls 
for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the country’s territory cannot 
automatically justify a prohibition of its assemblies (Judgment of 2 October 2001, 
para. 97). Other than measures to promote a more effective democracy,16 or to protect 
the democratic order itself, the state should not interfere with political activity and 
debate.17 Indeed a healthy democracy should facilitate debate, creating means of 
communication between political parties and marginalized groups, and access to 
national political debate by marginal or minority viewpoints. 
The importance of elections has already been noted. No citizens may be 
unreasonably excluded from the electoral process. The human rights instruments 
recognize limited ground for excluding individuals from the right to vote or to stand 
as a candidate, for example, in the case of minors and convicted criminals. 
Membership of a minority group can never constitute reasonable grounds for 
exclusion. Individuals from minority groups expressing intolerant or anti-democratic 
positions may be excluded on the basis of their political opinions, but not their 
identity. Certain restrictions, although on the face of things objective and reasonable, 
                                                 
16 Restriction on the right to participate in political debate and activity may be justified to protect the 
rights of others –  the electorate –  to an effective political democracy: Ahmed and others v United 
Kingdom, Reports 1998-VI, at para. 54. 
17 Political debate may only be limited where it does harm to democracy itself (Socialist Party and 
others v Turkey, ECHR, Reports 1998-III, para. 47). Thus a political party may campaign for a change 
in the law on two conditions: (1) the means used to that end must in every respect be legal and 
democratic; (2) the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles: 
Refah Partisi and others v. Turkey, ECHR judgment of 31 July 2001, para. 47. 
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can disproportionately affect the right of minorities to political participation. For 
nomadic minorities residence requirements may cause difficulties. Other problematic 
criteria include citizenship and language restrictions. Rights of political participation, 
unlike other human rights, are granted only to citizens. Where, as in parts of the 
former Soviet Union, individuals are excluded from citizenship by the application of 
restrictive, ethnically based, criteria for citizenship or the use of language tests, this 
has the effect of disenfranchising large sections of the permanent population who are 
nevertheless subject to the adopted laws. 
In a multilingual polity, regulations on the use of official or working language(s) in 
public life can act to exclude members of minorities. The right to freedom of 
expression protects the right to use of the minority languages to discuss political 
questions in the public sphere. The abilities of a candidate to function effectively as a 
representative are not normally grounds for his or her exclusion from the electoral 
process. Numerous, though not enough, representatives in national parliaments are 
visually, aurally or orally impaired. The provision of facilities to ensure that the 
candidate can participate in parliamentary debates and activities is a separate question, 
involving practical and economic considerations. Yet human rights bodies have not 
been willing to determine that language requirements for candidates are in themselves 
a violation of the right to political participation. In Ignatane v Latvia (No. 884/1999, 
decision 31 July 2001) and Podkolzina v. Latvia (Judgment of 9 April 2002), the 
Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights determined a 
violation respectively of Article 25, ICCPR and P1-3, ECHR. The individuals 
concerned were removed from the list of candidates for election after it was decided 
they did not possess the required minimum official language qualification. Both 
decisions turned on procedural questions and did not concern the central issue as to 
whether such restrictions are themselves compatible with the right to political 
participation. The choice of working language for a national parliament is one for the 
state. Candidates may not be prevented from standing on account of their linguistic, 
religious or cultural identity. They should not be prevented from standing because 
they do not have the required language skills of the official or working languages of 
the national parliament. It is for the electorate to determine their choice of 
representative.  
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In most cases the will of the people will be divided, and this must be reflected in 
the outcome of any election. Each vote must count equally, but there is no requirement 
that each vote should have equal effect in the determination of the outcome of 
political power. Electoral systems must both reflect fairly faithfully the opinions of the 
people, and channel currents of thought so as to promote the emergence of a 
sufficiently clear and coherent political will (see Case of Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt 
(1987) Series A No. 113, para. 54). Elections must produce a government with a 
popular mandate to rule and ensure that no significant interests, preferences and 
identities are excluded from representation. The legislative body is not simply charged 
with passing government legislation but with examining and considering proposed 
action. Democracy, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) Universal 
Declaration on Democracy, requires the existence of a parliament in which “all 
components of society are represented and which has the requisite powers and means 
to express the will of the people by legislating and overseeing government action”.18  
Whilst the presumption must be for equal voting weights and for an equal number 
of voters in each constituency, the electoral system may deviate from this to facilitate 
a more representative legislative body. Where members of minorities are not 
represented, the state must consider the introduction of measures to facilitate 
representation. Where this may be achieved by the removal of barriers to participation 
that is to be preferred. Where not, positive measures should be introduced. A report by 
the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) 
concluded that a fairer representation of minorities results not so much from the 
application of rules peculiar to minorities, as from the implementation of general rules 
on electoral law, albeit adjusted, where required, to increase the chances of success by 
candidates from minority groups (2000: 4). Where minorities are concentrated 
territorially, single-member districts may provide sufficient minority representation. In 
other cases, proportional representation systems, where a political party’s share in the 
national vote is reflected in its share of the legislative seats; some forms of preference 
voting, where voters rank candidates in order of choice; or lower numerical thresholds 
                                                 
18 Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Universal Declaration on Democracy: www.ipu.org. Adopted without a 
vote by the Inter-Parliamentary Council at its 161st session (Cairo, 16 September 1997), reprinted 1 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights (2000) 127 para. 11. The IPU, established in 1889, is the world 
organization of parliaments of sovereign states. Over a hundred national parliaments are currently 
members. 
 9
for representation in the legislature may enhance the inclusion of national minorities 
in governance (Lund Recommendation (‘LR’) 9). These issues are considered in more 
detail in an OSCE/ODIHR publication, Guidelines to Assist National Minority 
Participation in the Electoral Process (2001: 17-26). 
Parliament is an important forum for deliberation and decision-making. It is not the 
only one within the state. Decisions are made in Ministries, local government and by 
quasi-governmental organizations. It is important that the interests and preferences of 
citizens from minority groups are represented at all levels of government decision-
making. This requires as a minimum that the state consult with members of minorities 
before measures are adopted that might impact upon the cultural security of the group. 
The importance of consultation is reflected in the UN Declaration on Minorities (Art. 
2(3)) and in the Framework Convention on National Minorities (Art. 15). International 
human rights bodies demonstrate a particular concern that the principle of deliberative 
inclusion has been given effect, and that a majority decision has resulted from 
reasoned public debate and not the simple aggregation of preferences and interests.19 
The Lund Recommendations commend the establishment of formal advisory or 
consultative bodies to facilitate effective communication (LR 12). Such bodies, they 
argue, should be able to raise issues with decision-makers, prepare recommendations, 
formulate legislative and other proposals, monitor developments and provide views on 
proposed governmental decisions that may directly or indirectly affect minorities (LR 
13). The right of inclusion in the process of deliberation and decision-making is 
clearly important for minorities. If democracy is conceived as a process to determine 
where a majority lies on a particular issue, then participation, particularly for 
minorities by will/ethno-cultural minorities will provide insufficient protection for 
their interests. The next section considers arguments that ethno-cultural minorities 
should be exempted from the application of majority rule and considers the 
justification for such an exemption.  
 
                                                 
19 See, Länsman et al. v Finland (No. 2), HRC, Communication No. 671/1995, UN Doc. 
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995, 22 November 1996, para. 10.5; Mahuika et al v New Zealand, HRC, 
Communication No. 547/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993, 15 November 2000, para. 9.8; Hopu 
and Bessert v France, HRC, Communication No. 549/1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993/Rev.1, 
29 December 1997, para. 10.3.  
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III. “ Having control”  
 
No right of autonomy exists for minorities or peoples under international law. With 
notable exceptions autonomy has not featured in the international instruments on 
minority rights.20 Those groups who constitute a ‘people’ within the state, possessing 
the right to self-determination,21 have the right to have their distinct character 
reflected in the institutions of government under which they live (Brownlie 1988: 5). 
They do not have the right to autonomy. It might be a good idea, “but it does not flow 
freely from the sources of international law as an obligation on States” (Thornberry 
2000: 56). A demand for autonomy by an ethno-cultural group constitutes a political 
claim for recognition of the moral right to self-governance. It is a controversial idea in 
a democracy. If a majority of political equal citizens have agreed to the introduction of 
a specific measure, and if it is accepted that it does not constitute an unreasonable 
interference in individual liberty, then those opposed must accept the decision. 
Individuals are not permitted to exempt themselves from the application of laws that 
they did not support. Claims for autonomy for minorities require recognition that, on 
certain issues, members of language, religious or cultural minorities have the right to 
both participate in the formulation of general laws, and to be to be exempted from 
them. For Packer, the recognition of regimes of autonomy as one aspect of political 
participation follows from the idea of, what he calls, ‘good governance’: 
 
[T]he notion of good governance may be summarised in the idea that the 
government reflect the ‘will of the people’ –  meaning the whole population so 
                                                 
20 Those exceptions are the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Council of 
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly’s Recommendation 1201, and the OSCE Copenhagen Document. 
The latter simply notes that one of the possible means to protect and promote minority cultures is the 
introduction of “appropriate local or autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific 
historical and territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with the policies of the 
State concerned”. See, also, “Various concepts of autonomy as well as other approaches outlined in the 
above-mentioned documents, which are in line with OSCE principles, constitute ways to preserve and 
promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities within an existing 
State”: OSCE Charter For European Security, Istanbul, November 1999, 39 ILM 255 (2000), para. 19. 
Article 11, of Recommendation 1201: “In the regions where they are in a majority the persons 
belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal appropriate local or 
autonomous authorities or to have a special status, matching the specific historical and territorial 
situation and in accordance with the domestic legislation of the State”. The proposed minority rights 
protocol to the ECHR was rejected by the Heads of State and Government of the Council of Europe.  
21 Consider, for example, the determination of the Canadian Supreme Court in Reference re Secession 
of Quebec [1998]: “It is clear that ‘a people’ may include only a portion of the population of an existing 
state”: [1998] 2 S.C.R. Reference re Secession of Quebec 217, para. 124.  
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far as practicable. In this regard, majority decision-making may be viewed as the 
default position where …  the will of the people is divided. Good governance, 
therefore, requires that steps be taken so far as practicable to accommodate the 
minority will(s) in an effort to respond to the whole population (2000: 39). 
 
Self-governance rights for minorities flow from a recognition of the political equality 
of all citizens in a polity. This argument makes little sense where democratic 
government is conceived of as a mechanism for aggregating the preferences of equal 
citizens to determine the majority. In contrast, if the deliberative understanding of 
democracy, developed by Habermas in Between Facts and Norms (1996) and a 
number of other influential writers,22 is accepted, then recognition of the legitimacy of 
autonomy regimes of ethno-cultural minorities becomes possible. The deliberative 
model of democracy accepts that each citizen has a genuinely equal share in the 
exercise of power. The requirements of a deliberative system of democratic decision-
making are as follows: 
the equal and uncoerced participation of all … . All issues have to be open to 
question; all opinions voiced in conditions of equality and free from domination. 
Decision processes have to be conditioned by the desire of participants to reach 
agreement in the absence of coercion or threat of coercion. To this end each has 
to put forward reasons that others could reasonably accept, and seek acceptance 
for their reasons, and reject proposals on the basis that insufficiently good 
reasons have been offered for them: the requirement of public reason. The only 
influence thus exercised is the force of the better argument (Black 2000: 609). 
 
The cardinal features of the deliberative model are political equality, participation (i.e. 
inclusion) and consensus. Legitimate policies emerge through a process of rational 
deliberation between equal participants who must agree on what should be done. The 
importance of deliberation as a good in political decision-making is recognized in the 
Lund Recommendations, which talk of the need to ensure that minorities have an 
‘effective voice’ at the level of the central government (LR 6). Equally, the Flensburg 
Proposals, drawn up by a group of international experts, speak of the need to provide 
mechanisms to increase the opportunities for minorities to “make themselves heard” 
(para. 5). Both argue for the establishment of advisory or consultative bodies to serve 
                                                 
22 In addition to the work cited in this article, see, the collection of essays in S. Benhabib (ed.) 
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political  (1996); and J. Bohman and W. 
Rehg (eds) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (1997). Also J. Dryzek, 
Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations  (2002); and Oquendo, 
“Deliberative Democracy in Habermas and Nino”, 22 OJLS (2002). 
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as “channels for dialogue” to ensure the “effective communication” of minority 
interests (Flensburg Proposal 8 and LR 12). Both recognize that a key feature of 
democratic government is deliberation between interested parties. The system of 
government may be designed to facilitate the inclusion of minorities in decision-
making bodies, including as members of the government.  
There are a number of examples of minority parties forming part of a governing 
coalition. The extent to which this model of deliberative model of democracy is 
compatible with consociational democracy is beyond the scope of this work. Whilst, a 
consociational system of government violates the principle of majority rule, it does 
not, according to Lijphart, “deviate very much from normative democratic theory” 
(Lijphart, 1969: 214). The deliberative model of democracy does not accept the 
majoritarian concept of democracy, but requires democratic government to facilitate, 
as far as possible, the emergence of a consensus, amongst all concerned citizens, as to 
what is to be done. What Lijphart calls self-determined consociationalism, where the 
political system is structured to encourage the emergence of power-sharing 
arrangements (but they are neither required nor prescribed by the constitution) is 
probably not incompatible with a deliberative conception of democracy (Lijphart, 
1995: 280). 
The ideal, hypothetical, model of deliberative democracy assumes that individuals 
will be willing to change positions they have initially adopted where faced with a 
better, more compelling, argument. Given sufficient time and goodwill on the part of 
all concerned, a consensus on what is to be done should always be possible. In the real 
world, there will seldom be sufficient time and goodwill. As a non-decision amounts 
to an implicit one in favour of the status quo, there must be a positive decision from 
the participants. If, following reasoned public debate, a majority determine that A is 
the right thing to do, then there is a presumption that this conclusion is rational and 
legitimate (Benhabib 1996: 72). This is the justification for majority rule in a 
democracy. On certain issues involving ethno-cultural minorities this legitimacy basis 
of majority rule is not present. Where it is agreed that a uniform rule is required, 
individuals from the majority and minority cultural groups will not be capable of 
reaching a rational consensus, irrespective of the amount of time and goodwill 
devoted to a particular issue. On questions on the name of the state, the design of its 
flag, the choice of national anthem, designation of public holidays, use of public 
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languages and questions of education policy both sides will argue for their preferences 
to be accepted –  because these issues are central to their distinctive identity. The fact 
that a majority agree on policy choice A cannot create a presumption of rationality and 
legitimacy. The respective communities must agree to recognize their differences and 
similarities, and reach an agreement that accommodates the differences in appropriate 
institutions and similarities in shared ones (Tully 1995: 131). Preference should be 
given to those arrangements that accommodate diversity in shared institutions. 
Measures may be introduced to guarantee the cultural security of the group. These 
might include the funding of minority cultural activity, the licensing of a minority 
television or radio channel, or the recognition of minority language as one of the 
official or working languages of the state.  
The Lund Recommendations conclude that effective participation of minorities in 
public life involves not only a right to a say in decision-making, but in certain 
circumstances, the establishment of “non-territorial or territorial arrangements of self-
governance or a combination thereof” (LR 14). The Recommendations continue: “It is 
essential to the success of such arrangements that governmental authorities and 
minorities recognize the need for central and uniform decisions in some areas of 
governance together with the advantages of diversity in others” (LR 15). Self-
governance, or autonomy, regimes create a space within which an individual or group 
may be self-determining, free from government interference. They may be personal, 
cultural or territorial in nature. Personal (sometimes individual) autonomy provides, 
for members of minority groups only, a right to be exempted from the application of 
general laws. In the United Kingdom, members of the Sikh community are exempt 
from the legal requirement to wear crash helmets whilst riding motorcycles. Cultural 
autonomy concerns self-governance arrangements which provide the minority group 
control over specific aspects of life, but within a territory over which the minority 
group does not enjoy legislative or regulatory autonomy. The government might 
recognize the right of a minority group to determine elements of the curriculum for 
those schools where a majority of students identify themselves with the minority 
group. According to the Lund Recommendations, “the issues most susceptible to 
cultural autonomy arrangements are education, culture, use of minority language, 
religion, and other matters crucial to the identity and way of life of national 
minorities” (LR 18).  
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Demands for individual or cultural autonomy are often less threatening to the state 
than claims for territorial autonomy and for the transfer of power and authority from 
the central government. Such claims are often strongly resisted by the state which 
fears for its territorial integrity. The Lund Recommendations note that all democracies 
have arrangements for governance at different territorial levels (LR 19). Localized 
government allows decision-making to be more responsive, less remote, and to enjoy 
a greater degree of participation and sense of ownership by the local population, thus 
giving the decision a greater degree of legitimacy. Appropriate functions that may be 
devolved include education, culture, use of minority language, environment, local 
planning, natural resources, economic development, local policing functions, and 
housing, health, and other social services (LR 20). Autonomy (self-governance) 
arrangements are introduced in response to the heterogeneous nature of the 
population. It is the devolution of authority to those parts of the population that 
conceive of themselves as distinct from the majority population. There must, after all, 
be a ‘self’ to which the self-governance regime may be applied. The Lund 
Recommendations call for the establishment of autonomous administrations that 
correspond to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of national 
minorities (LR 20), and for asymmetrical devolution to respond to different minority 
situations (LR 15). Their purpose is to “improve the opportunities of minorities to 
exercise authority over matters affecting them” (LR 19). Such arrangements do not 
involve the transfer of authority from democratically elected national governments to 
unaccountable local elites. Any autonomy arrangement must respect the human rights 
of all those citizens within their jurisdiction (LR 3), and be “based on democratic 
principles to ensure that they genuinely reflect the views of the affected population” 
(LR 16).  
Kymlicka has argued that territorial autonomy is the most effective way of 
accommodating sub-state nations, what he terms, ‘national minorities’ i.e. groups that 
formed complete and functioning societies on their historic homeland prior to being 
incorporated into a larger state (Kymlicka 2001: 23). Territorial autonomy allows 
these groups to engage in a competing process of nation-building so as to protect their 
societal culture in their traditional territory (ibid. 25). Immigrant communities are 
excluded from consideration. They are too small and territorially dispersed to hope to 
create a viable societal culture (ibid. 30). Political accommodation requires agreement 
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between certain groups, defined by their historical relationship to the territory, on the 
degree and nature of territorial autonomy. In Canada, the political settlement must 
accommodate three distinct identities: the dominant Anglo-Canadian identity; the 
French-Canadian identity; and the plurality of identities of the various truly 
indigenous groups. All other immigrant groups, and their descendants, are required to 
accommodate themselves to the dominant (Anglo-Canadian) identity, except in 
Quebec where they must accommodate themselves to the French-Canadian identity. 
Members of the three recognized identity groups are privileged over those of all other 
groups, who constitute in excess of one-quarter of the population, making nonsense of 
any claim of political equality for all citizens. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosniacs, Serbs 
and Croats are considered the ‘constituent peoples’ of the state. Other groups are 
‘merely’ minorities. As Packer notes, such distinctions, normally on the basis of ‘new’ 
versus ‘old’ minorities, when applied between equal citizens constitutes simply an act 
of discrimination (Packer 1999: 264). Political equality is a core democratic principle. 
It demands the recognition of the equality of individuals, not groups. Difference is 
accommodated by recognizing that members of ethno-cultural minorities may not be 
subject to a simple application of majority rule on issues central to their distinct 
(linguistic, religious or cultural) identity. Experience has shown that members of 
minority groups –  citizens of the state –  that have been formed through the process of 
recent migration patterns are more likely to assimilate into the dominant culture than 
long-established minority cultures, but they cannot be required to do so.23 Territorial 
autonomy is unlikely to be demanded by such groups, but claims for individual and 
cultural autonomy are increasingly made. To exclude such groups from any 




The heterogeneous state must find a way of accommodating the differences that exist 
amongst its population without violating the right of minority groups to cultural 
                                                 
23 This is made clear by Article 27, ICCPR. The Human Rights Committee has indicated that Article 
27, ICCPR would cover recent immigrant groups, and even non-citizens, nor those even permanent 
residents: Human Rights Committee General Comment 25 (57) on Article 27, ICCPR, adopted by the 
Committee at its 1510th Meeting, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 (1996), paras. 5.1 and 5.2.  
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security, or paralysing its ability to govern. It is a difficult balance, with failure having 
severe destabilizing effects. One of the advantages of democratic institutions is their 
ability to channel competing interests into arenas of discourse, leading to 
compromises that can be respected by all, thus avoiding the need of any participants 
for recourse to violence. The fear of minorities has always been that of a tyranny of 
majority rule. This is possible if democracy is conceived as an aggregative model of 
government. It is not possible under an effective deliberative model of democracy. It 
has been argued that deliberative democracy is not simply an additional theoretical 
model, but one that elucidates some aspects of the logic of democratic practices better 
than others, albeit in imperfect form (Benhabib, 1996: 84). It is a model which finds 
implicit recognition in the judgements of national constitutional courts and 
international human rights bodies and one which sits more easily with the principle of 
equality and with the internal aspect of the right to self-determination, which requires 
that the government of a state be representative of all the people, not simply a 
majority. Deliberation is conducted by equal citizens. The fact that a majority 
determine that a particular policy is to be preferred does not a priori make it 
acceptable. Democracy is not the will of the majority simpliciter. No state may 
discriminate as to the right of political participation between citizens. The democratic 
state is required to be as inclusive as possible in deliberations on the political 
questions of the day. It should, in principle, seek agreement from all reasonable 
persons as to what should be done. Where majority decisions produce complaints 
about interferences in individual liberty the state must be able to give reasons for its 
actions and show that those reasons are sufficient to justify the interference. This 
principle applies to all citizens and is the basis of any human rights regime. In relation 
to ethno-cultural minorities a further consideration comes into play.  
Where the interference is on a subject that individuals from a minority could not 
reasonably accept, because of their distinctive cultural values, the state must 
demonstrate that it has considered introducing special measures to mitigate the impact 
on such groups. These may be in measures to improve the group’s cultural security or 
regimes of autonomy where relevant. Where not introduced, the state must provide 
reasons and show that such reasons were sufficient to justify its lack of action. 
Arguments for the introduction of territorial autonomy would be restricted to 
circumstances where the minority group is large and territorially concentrated, and 
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where the differences between the majority and minority cultures are significant. They 
should enjoy the support of both the minority population and the other citizens of the 
state. The value of a deliberative understanding of democracy for minorities is not that 
it necessarily affords them a share of political power but that it requires them to be 
recognized as equal, albeit culturally distinct, members of the polity with a right to be 
included in the decision-making process and to a right of self-governance in 
circumstances where the dominant culture would otherwise conflict with their own. 
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